Abstract. Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production and is only gradually dissolved by the environment. It can be reduced by producing less and by cleaning up the environment, but neither occur when they are left to the market. Cleaning activities and the optimal emission charges increase with the stock of pollutants. When one allows for pollution of the environment an the classical Ramsey problem, the capital stock is less than in the market outcome and afortiori less than under the golden rule. The analysis distinguishes between stock and flow externahues arising from pollution. An increase in impatience can lead to more capital accumulation, even though this leaves less room for current consumption.
Introduction
Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production, which damages the environment and is only gradually dissolved. Since there are no private markets for pollution rights, market outcomes are inefficient and give rise to too much production and pollution (e.g., Dasgupta, 1982) . The four standard approaches to environmental policy are property rights, binding quota restrictions, Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, and markets for pollution permits. The problem with property rights is that they are difficult to define, since many pollution and environmental problems are characterised by the problem of the common. The problem with quotas is that emission standards are difficult to enforce and lead to high administrative costs, whilst the difficulty with emission charges and permits is that they only apply in well-behaved situations without non-convexities. The present paper focuses, nevertheless, on optimal emission charges in the context of a dynamic pollution problem embedded in the Ramsey model. Since pollution is essentially a problem of missing markets, the emission charges correspond to the social price of an additional unit of pollution.
Section 2 considers pollution control when waste is a by-product of production. Distinction is made between the social costs of both the flow and the stock of pollutants. The market outcome and the socially optimal outcome are compared. Because in the absence of government intervention there will be too much pollution and not enough abatement activities, Pigouvian tax and subsidy schemes can be used to sustain the socially optimal outcome in a decentralised market economy. Section 3 reviews the Ramsey problem of optimal consumption and capital accumulation and thereby sets the scene for later sections. Section 4 discusses how environmental stock and flow externalities can be added to the Ramsey framework and discusses previous work in this area. Sections 5 and 6 focus on Pigouvian tax and subsidy schemes and show how they can be used to correct for environmental flow and stock externalities in the Ramsey problem. Section 7 discusses the socially optimal level of abatement activities within the context of a Ramsey model with social costs associated with a stock of waste products. It is then possible that more impatience leads to more capital accumulation, despite the fact that this leaves less room for current private consumption. Section 8 analyses why the market invests too little in clean technology and Section 9 briefly considers the implications for environmental policy when renewable resources are used as factors of production. Section 10 concludes the paper.
Pollution Control
It is assumed for the time being, that there is no investment in physical capital; later sections relax this assumption. Consumption, C, is thus production of goods, Y, minus the amount of output that is used to clean up the environment, A. Production is limited by the availability of given factors of production, so Y ~< Ymax' Net social benefits of consumption are given by B ( C ) , B ' > 0, and marginal benefits are decreasing in the level of consumption, B" < 0. One reason may be that as a society consumes more, it needs to produce more and thus needs to work harder and forego more leisure in order to secure an additional unit of consumption. To rule out non-positive levels of consumption, it is assumed that B'(0) = co. Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production, a Y, where a > 0 denotes the emissionoutput ratio. The emission-output ratio can be improved by investment in new technology, but this will be ignored for the time being (see Section 8). The stock of pollutants, S, follows from
where a(A) >/ 0 denotes the rate at which pollutants are dissolved by the environment. There is an amount A of total production Y devoted to cleaning-up activities. The rate at which pollutants are dissolved is higher when more efforts are made to clean up the environment, o' > 0. Returns to such efforts are diminishing, c~" < 0. Pollutants such as DDT dissolve very slowly, whilst herbicides dissolve quite quickly. The social welfare function is given by
W ---e x p ( -0 t ) [ B ( Y --A ) --D F ( a Y ) --Ds(S)] dt, (2.2)

